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Religions as Sovereigns: Why Religion is “Special”1
Elizabeth A. Clark
Abstract
Commentators increasingly challenge religion’s privileged legal status, arguing that it is not
“special” or distinct from other associations or philosophical or conscientious claims. I propose that
religion is “special” because it functions metaphorically as a legal sovereign, asserting supreme
authority over a realm of human life. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious freedom can
be understood as at least partial deference to a religious sovereign in a system of shared or
overlapping sovereignty. This Article suggests that federalism, which also involves shared
sovereignty, can provide a useful heuristic device for examining religious freedom. Specifically, the
Article examines a range of federalism theories and the values of (and concerns about) federalism
that they identify and draws strong parallels with a range of theories of religious freedom,
highlighting its similar values and potential weaknesses. This comparative endeavor highlights the
powerful resonance of sovereignty talk in the religion and law field and suggests that sovereignty is
part of the deep structure of our understanding of religious liberty.

Outline
I. Is Religion “Special”?
II. Religions as Sovereigns
III. Shared Sovereignty and the Federalism Heuristic
IV. Values of Federalism and Religious Freedom
a. Whose Federalism?
b. Dual Federalism and Separate Spheres
i. Dual federalism and its values
ii. Sphere sovereignty theories and their values
c. Process Federalism and Smith: Long Live Political Safeguards
i. Process federalism and its values
ii. Smith and the values of religious freedom
d. “Federalism as Limits” and Its Values: The Judiciary to the Rescue
i. “Federalism as limits” and its values
ii. Sherbert/Yoder and the values of “religious freedom as limits”
e. Modernists and Post-Modernists
i. Madisonians, decentralizers, and neo-Federalists: Federalism’s values (or lack
thereof)
ii. Madisonians, anti-religious freedomists, and neo-religious freedomists?
V. Taking Sovereignty Seriously: Sovereignty and “Specialness”
a. The Value and Values of the Federalism Heuristic
b. So Is Religion “Special”?: Sovereignty and Deep Structure

1

Many thanks to my BYU colleagues Lisa Grow Sun, Fred Gedicks, David Kirkham, David Moore, Carolina Nuñez,
and John Fee for comments on various drafts of and ideas for this paper. Thanks also to David Choules, Rachel Snow,
Katelyn Trottier, Carl Hollan, and Joseph Sorensen for research assistance.

1

I.

Is Religion “Special”?

A key debate underlying many contemporary discussions of religion and law revolves
around religious exceptionalism. Is religion “special”? 2 Should religion or religious beliefs be
privileged in law over non-religious associations and over artistic, philosophical, or conscientious
beliefs? 3 Some of the most heated contemporary debates in the law and religion field turn, at their
heart, on assumptions or disagreements about religious exceptionalism. For example, different
views of the value, necessity, or uniqueness of religion leads to vastly differing outcomes in
conflicts between religion and other civil rights,4 arguments over the value or constitutionality of
religious exemptions,5 and questions of whether religious organizations should be singled out for
government cooperation or disengagement. So much of these debates turns on the weight to be
given to religious liberty and maintaining religious distinctiveness, values which can have little or
much meaning depending on one’s sense of whether religion is truly “different.” At times, religious
exceptionalism slides into the question of the definition of religion,6 as that definition is ultimately
an issue of overlapping normative universes; concerns about the limits of a narrow (or broad)
normative field of protection can be expressed in argument or in definitional limits.7
While it may seem to some “remarkable”8 and anti-textual or anti-historical9 to raise the
question, it is increasingly being raised, both by scholars10 and in the popular arena.11 A variety of
2

Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L.REV. 75 (1990); Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion
Clauses: Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 1131 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious
Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L.REV. 1243 (1999-2000); Andrew Koppleman, Is it Fair to Give Religion
Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L.REV. 571 (2006); Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV 555 (1998); William Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion
Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L.REV. 243 (1993-94); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT.REV. 123;
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1315 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the SoCalled Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-up, 29 CARDOZO L.REV. 225
(2007-08); MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); Micah Schwartzman,
What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L.REV. (forthcoming 2013).
3
See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note __; Gedicks, supra note __; Sager and Eisgruber, supra note __.
4
See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, ET AL., EDS., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS
(2008); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from
Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007).
5
See, e.g., ISSAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
CORRECTNESS 15 (1996); Stephen Gey, Why is Religion Special?, supra note __; 182; Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation:
The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, supra note __.
6
See, e.g., Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty, supra note __ (addressing the uniqueness of religion in the
context of definition); Ingber, Religion or Ideology, supra note __ (same).
7
Cole Durham and I have explored at length the issue of overlapping normative conceptions in definition problems. See
W. Cole Durham and Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW (James A. Serritella, ed. 2006) ,
8
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Evangelical Church v. EEOC, 565 U.S. __ (2012), slip op at 14 (“We cannot
accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to
select its own ministers.”).
9
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Three Theories of Religious Equality . . . and of Exemptions, 87 TEX.L.REV. 963, 963-4
(2008-09) (“Furthermore, in the face of two clauses in the First Amendment explicitly committed to protecting religious
liberty, coming in the wake of clear paradigmatic historical instances of religious persecution that the framers wished to
alleviate, Chris Eisgruber and Larry Sager argue that it is a misreading of the Constitution to treat religious practice as
distinctive for either establishment or free exercise purposes”).
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arguments are raised on either side. Defenders of the uniqueness of religion provide textual12 and a
normative arguments, although they differ greatly in which normative arguments they find
persuasive. 13 Some argue for the role of religious views of the value of religious liberty,14 while
others suggest that the case for religious liberty should be religion-neutral.15 Opponents of religious
exceptionalism identify yet other values at play,16 such as contemporary liberal commitments to
equality and autonomy, which undermine the value of religious distinctiveness.17
In this article, I explore a different approach for defending the uniqueness of religion, one
which I argue can provide a deep structural basis for thinking about the exceptionalism of religion
and the “disparate and wide-ranging”18 arguments over the value of religious freedom. I propose
that a crucial point in understanding religious exceptionalism comes with the understanding that
religious organizations function as sovereigns, or non-state legal orders. Several law and religion
scholars have suggested this point in passing.19 Steven Smith, Perry Dane, and Paul Horowitz have
10

Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark.
Little Rock L. Rev 555 (1998); Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L.REV. 75 (1990); William Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux,
1992 SUP. CT.REV. 123; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1315 (1994).
11
SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF REASON; RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD
DELUSION;CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING.
12
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that, as a textual
matter, religion is singled out in the U.S. Constitution by negative implication—in contrast to religion, the Constitution
has no bars on establishment of official views on or subsidies for philosophical, ethical, or social issues; Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEM. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996).
13
These include: privacy (McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, supra note __, 20-21.); the importance of
religion to religious believers (Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note __); religion’s role in civil society and
in encouraging civic virtue (McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, supra note __, 21-23; Timothy L. Hall,
Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 Tul. L.Rev. 87 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Red, White,and
Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 273-75 (1988); see Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions, supra note __); government incompetence to judge religious truth (McConnell, The Problem of Singling
Out Religion, supra note __, 23-28); the comparative unimportance of religion to government (Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, supra note __, 317-18); the precedence of religious obligations to believers (Stanley Ingber, Religion
or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 Stan. L.Rev. 233 (1988-89); Garvey, Free Exercise and
the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 Conn. L.Rev. 779, 792-97 (1986)); the importance of protecting minorities (Alan E.
Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality,
and Speech in the Constitution, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 89, 112 (1990)); the value of religion as a form of “strong evaluation”
(Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 571); the power of religious
personal commitments and associational bonds (Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory
of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 357 (1996)); and the need to minimize social conflict over religion
(Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note __, 321-22; Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty, supra
note __).
14
John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument For Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEM. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996); JOHN H.
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1997); Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra note __.
15
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty), supra note __.
16
Sager and Eisgruber, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. Chi. L. Rev. (1994) (arguing that states should show equal respect to all of their citizens, and privileging religious
beliefs and conscience over deep non-religious convictions would be unfair); Sager and Eisgruber, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (1994) (same); Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74
Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996) (same);
17
Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation, supra note __; Sager and Eisgruber, The Vulnerability of Conscience, supra note __.
18
Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, supra note __ at 250.
19
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, supra note __ at 29-30. See .e.g., id. at 30 (“We might draw an
analogy to citizens of other nations, or children of other parents. When a citizen of another nation is in our midst, we go
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discussed it in somewhat more depth,20 and Cole Durham and I have argued for this as part of a
definition of religion based on limited deference.21
In this article, however, I not only flesh out the idea of religions as sovereigns, but also
discuss objections to it and propose that limited deference to religious organizations can be
conceptualized metaphorically as a form of split sovereignty, in many ways similar to federalism.
Understanding religious organizations as sovereigns, I argue, not only explains religious uniqueness
but, together with the federalism heuristic, provides a framework for identifying additional clusters
of values supporting arguments for (and some objections to) broad religious freedom. Conceptions
of religious sovereignty can provide a deep structure to debates such as those over religious
exemptions or the conflicts of rights. This is so not only because these debates turn on assumptions
of religious exceptionalism, but also because division of sovereignty provides a powerful analogy
for understanding the interactions of religion and law.
In Section III, I explore the meaning of sovereignty and its historical ties with religion and also
address some initial concerns about the applicability of sovereignty to religions. In Section III, I
propose the heuristic device of federalism, or shared state sovereignty, to engage the question of the
value of shared sovereignty of religion. I employ this heuristic device in Section IV with a range of
theories of federalism (from dual sovereignty to post-modernist approaches) to specifically consider
the values underlying federalism, finding that the values and theories of federalism parallel in many
striking ways the values and theories of religious freedom. The comparatively well-ordered
discussions on federalism serve to provide a sometimes foil and oftentimes map to the less-ordered
debates on religious freedom. I identify some additional intriguing possibilities of the federalism
heuristic that are beyond the scope of this article, but return in conclusion in Section V to the
challenges raised to religious exceptionalism, examining these in light of a religion-as-sovereign
approach. I conclude that a religion-as-sovereign approach provides not only a significant argument
itself as to why religion is “special,” but, together with a federalism heuristic, also identifies a broad
range of values (and some concerns) underlying religious freedom. I argue that federalism provides
out of our way to avoid putting him into a position of conflict between our ways and loyalty to his own country, not
because we agree with his assessment of the virtues of his own land, but rather, because we recognize the virtue of
patriotism even in a person whose patria we do not admire.”); Michael W. Connell, Why is Religious Liberty the “First
Freedom?”21 CARDOZO L.REV. 1243, 1256 (1999-2000); Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions about the Religion
Clauses: Reflections on Some Critiques 47 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 1131, 1146 (2010) (“Although I have written about
‘fairness’ in relation to religion and the state, I do not perceive that as barring a jurisdictional approach, as conceiving
some domains within our society, notably including churches and similar institutions of other religions, as largely
outside the scope of state authority. Some doctrines I defend are best seen in these terms, and Richard Garnett and Paul
Horwitz have presented strong arguments why such a conception should play a larger role than I have accorded it.”).
Rick Garnett and Mary Ann Glendon have also advocated a related focus on the institutional aspects of religion. Richard
W. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, 4 J.Cath. Soc. Thought 59 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?:
Towards and Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 Vill. L.Rev. 273 (2008); Mary Ann Glendon, Law,
Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 672 (1992).
20
Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom? 122 HARV. L.REV. 1869 (2009); Paul
Horwtiz, The Philosopher’s Brief, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 285 (2008); Perry Dane, Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959 (1991); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres,
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 79 (2009); Perry Dane, The Public, The Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a Theme of
Nomos and Narrative, 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit. 15 (1996); Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in
CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Gerhard Robbers, ed., 2001); Perry Dane, The Corporation Sole
and the Encounter of Law and Church, in SACRED COMPANIES: ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION AND
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONS (Nicholas Jay Deremath ed., 1998); Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 Yale L.J. 350 (1980).
21
W. Cole Durham and Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW (James A. Serritella, ed. 2006) , 40-45.
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such a powerful analogy to religious freedom because religion-as-sovereign forms the deep structure
of religion and law in the United States; those seeking to expand as well as those who would restrict
religious freedom find themselves enmeshed in arguing questions of authority, jurisdiction, and
identity--that is, religious sovereignty.

II.

Religions as sovereigns

Legal scholars are increasingly looking at the existence of law beyond that created by the
state, and how non-state actors function much like states.22 In doing so, some use the term
“sovereignty” to refer to non-state legal orders that function much like states. Perry Dane, Paul
Horowitz, and Steven Smith have proposed this in the religious context, and I am indebted to them
on this topic.23 Others have hinted at this concept,24 but I am unaware of any full-scale treatment of
the implications of treating religions as legal sovereigns.
The modern Western concept of sovereignty is itself deeply tied to religious concepts and
history and has always co-existed with concepts of religious sovereignty. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the state is inconceivable without the church.25 The Western idea of state sovereignty
(seen as a mystical “body of the King”) was originally derived from religious conceptions of the
social organization of the Christian church as a body of Christ. 26 Modern Western divisions of
sovereign political states are generally dated back to the peace of Westphalia in 1648, which
resolved the religion-laden Thirty Year’s War through the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, or
the religion of the ruler as the religion of the territory.27 Religion, which had been the major
impetus for cross-border intervention, was subordinated to the ruler of a state, and the temporal
22

See, e.g., OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY (Barker trans. 1934), OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (Maitland trans. 1900), J. FIGGIS, CHURCHES AND THE MODERN STATE (1914); H.
KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE (G. Sabine & W. Shepard trans. 1922), H. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1921); H. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY (1917); H. ATHURS,
WITHOUT THE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1985); M.
HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975); Marc Galanter,
Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1(1981); Gottleib,
Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. LREV. 567 (1983), etc.
23
See especially Paul Horwtiz, Act III of the Ministerial Exemption, 106 NORTHWESTERN L.REV. 973 (2012); Perry
Dane, Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959 (1991), Steven Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra
note __ (using the term “jurisdictional” instead of “sovereign”) , and Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 79 (2009); see also Paul Horwitz, The Philosopher’s
Brief, 25 Const. Comment. 285 (2008); Perry Dane, The Public, The Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a Theme of
Nomos and Narrative, 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit. 15 (1996); Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in
CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Gerhard Robbers, ed., 2001); Perry Dane, The Corporation Sole
and the Encounter of Law and Church, in SACRED COMPANIES: ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION AND
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONS (Nicholas Jay Deremath ed., 1998); Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 Yale L.J. 350 (1980).
24
See supra note __.
25
JOSEPH STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE (1970), 83.
26
ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957);
Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010). Medieval Christian notions of the dual
natural/individual and mystical/collective natures of Christ were adapted to explain the dual nature of Kings, who were
held to have a natural and a political body, which became understood as the state. Kantorowitz at 17-19.
27
See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, in A. RUBIN, ED., ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION (1993), 3; Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010); J.N. FIGGIS, FROM GERSON
nd
TO GROTIUS 1414-1625 (2 ed. 1916) at 72.
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powers of the Roman Catholic Church were limited.28 In many ways, this tracked Martin Luther’s
concept that God’s authority was divided between two forms of government – “the realm of the
spirit,” which related to the soul of the believer and “the realm of the world,” which controlled
secular society.29 Later Protestant theorists understood this as “sphere sovereignty,” in which
church and state,30 or church, state and society31 each had responsibility and sovereignty for distinct
spheres of life.
The concept of religions as sovereigns has existed throughout the history of the concept of
sovereignty. It is interesting that the ascendancy of state sovereignty is coterminous with the defeat
of religion as an independent power. In many ways, the post-Westphalian state has defined itself by
its dominance over religion, its greatest challenger. The Western experience of religious freedom
was born of this challenge by religions to civil authorities.32 Regions of the world with nonhierarchical religions (that are thus less able to mount a unified challenge to the state) or ones, like
Eastern Orthodoxy, where the dominant religions have not traditionally challenged state
sovereignty,33 have a significantly less developed history of religious freedom.34 As I explain
further in following paragraphs, however, my arguments for understanding religious freedom as
shared sovereignty retain significance in the full range of religious and historical traditions.
The concept of religions as sovereigns, even as a metaphor, may seems less intuitive to
modern Western thinkers, however, because of the dominance of the idea of territoriality in
sovereignty and the loss of political and territorial power of churches since the Treaty of Westphalia.
Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin dealt extensively with the concept sovereignty, defining it as the
supreme power of a ruler in a territory.35 Most modern conceptions of sovereignty are based in
Hobbes and Bodin, although the supreme ruler is largely understood as a constitutional government
which exercises supreme authority and maintains legitimacy as an expression of the general will,
following Rousseau.36 Contemporary conceptions of sovereignty have become increasingly fluid,

28

See, e.g., Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010).
See, e.g., Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010); MARTIN LUTHER, ON SECULAR
AUTHORITY; Smith, Discourse in the Dusk, supra note __; Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra note __.
30
See Paul Horowitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note __ at 99-105; Siegfried van Duffel,
Sovereignty as a Religious Concept.
31
See Kuyper’s theory as detailed in Paul Horowitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions, supra note __.
32
Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT (Noel B.
Reynolds and W. Cole Durham, Jr., eds., 1996; JOHN WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION (2006), HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983).
33
See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Transitions to the Rule of Law, 21 J. OF DEMOC. 21 (2010), 37-39; Tierney, Religious
Rights in Historical Perspective, supra note __; W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Johan D. van der Vyver
and John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996). But see Richard Burghart, Hierarchical Models of the Hindu Social System, 13 MAN
(Dec. 1978), 519-36 (arguing that the Brahman, ascetic, and king each presented a competing hierarchical model of
Hindu society and that each person claimed the supreme rank according to his own hierarchical model of social
relations).
34
See generally RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES (John Witte Jr., and
Johan D. van der Vyver, eds., 1996), RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Johan
D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996).
35
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (ed. Julian H. Franklin, 1992) (originally
published as part of THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1576). .35 It is interesting, however, that Hobbes and
Bodin did see religious limits to political sovereignty—rulers were bound by divine law.
36
See, e.g., JOHN HOFFMAN, SOVEREIGNTY, 43-64.
29
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as transborder movements of ideas, goods, and peoples have increased37 and international-level
regulation increases.38 In essence, however, most definitions of sovereignty require that a holder of
sovereignty possess supreme authority over a territory.39 Authority is understood to be derived from
a source of legitimacy that is mutually acknowledged by the sovereign and its citizens.40
Modern understandings of non-state legal orders have led to the identification of some
modern NGOs and international organizations41 or trans-national corporations42 as non-state
sovereigns. Religions, however, should be considered the archetypal non-state legal sovereigns.
Religious belief systems exercise authority over believers, derived from a source of divine or
transcendent legitimacy mutually acknowledged by its citizens, or members.43 This is true not only
of Western or hierarchical religions—Hindus submit themselves to dharma,44 Taoists submit to the
Tao,45 and “Islam” literally means “submission,” understood as submission to the authority of
Allah.46 The emphasis on religion as an authoritative community rather than just a belief system
actually resonates much more clearly with non-Western traditions than with Western Christianity.47
Religions also exhibit a commitment to a jurisdiction, distinctiveness from other legal systems,
comprehensiveness of legal ordering, history, and territory, physical or metaphorical.48 In addition,
religious law and canons have formal legal effect in many countries,49 which explicitly recognize the
jurisdiction of religion over certain aspects of the life of a believer. States give these legal orders
respect and some deference. Recognizing sovereignty, especially in cases of overlapping
jurisdiction, does not of course mean that a sovereign is all-powerful, but it does mean treating it
with the dignity due another sovereign. For a non-state legal order like religion, this may mean that
37

See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999), 12; Virginie Guiraudon, A
Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control, 33 COMP. POL. STUDIES 2 (March 2000),
163-195.
38
Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law: Sovereignty: Organized
Hypocrisy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959 (2000); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401 (2000).
39
See, e.g., Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010);
40
See, e.g., Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010).
41
See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to NonGovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. (2000) 173,
210-11.
42
See.,e.g, John Spanier, Who Are the Non-State Actors? in WILLIAM C. OLSON, ED., THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43, 47 (8th ed., 1991); Ved P. Nanda, The Law of Transnational Business Transactions
Database (updated Sept. 2011), §1A:10 (The Westphalian model of sovereign states interacting only with other states in
the international system—the state-centered model—has given way in the post-Westphalian order, to the rise of nonstate
actors who play an increasingly influential role in global affairs.”).
43
Note that I am not proposing this as a definition of religion, but as a description of how religions function in the legal
sphere. For an exploration of some of sovereignty’s implications in the process of defining religion see W. Cole Durham
and Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF
IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW (James A. Serritella, ed. 2006).
44
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the state would recognize and defer to religious authority in some cases, such as the recognition of
institutional autonomy or in exemptions from more generalized laws.50 Religious freedom can be
conceptualized as recognition by the state of some degree of religious sovereignty.
As early as 1872, the United States Supreme Court has recognized religious sovereignty:
“whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been
decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”51 The Court later noted that
this early opinion “radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”52 Even in
Employment Division v. Smith, decided in 1990, one of the low-water marks of judicial protection of
religious freedom, the Court recognized that ”[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretation of those creeds.”53 The 2012 unanimous opinion in Hosanna-Tabor rehearsed
previous Supreme Court decisions supporting the independent authority of religions on issues of
belief, discipline, and organization and further stated that “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving
the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”54 Recognizing the
supreme control, or sovereignty, of religion over certain core areas is not a new concept, even in
U.S. law, and is bound up with understandings of religious freedom.55
I suggest that, in light of an understanding of religions as sovereigns, the U.S. experience
with shared sovereignty in federalism becomes a useful heuristic device to identify the values and
rationales for protecting religious freedom (which I address in Parts III and IV). A religion-assovereign theory also provides significant explanatory power in addressing the question of the
distinctiveness of religion (which I discuss in Part V). I argue that a religion-as-sovereign theory
highlights the deep structure of religious freedom and underlies even arguments opposing religious
freedom.
As an initial matter, my proposal of seeing religion as a sovereign may be met with two
objections. First, some argue that sovereignty is a dying concept, one that is becoming increasingly
irrelevant in a modern society.56 Political and legal theorists57 looking at federalism largely
marginalize the conception of sovereignty, seeing sovereignty as increasingly meaningless in a
modern world with more fluid borders and overlapping restrictions by international organizations.58
In a recent Harvard Law Review article, Heather Gerken criticizes conceptions of sovereignty,
particularly in discussions of federalism, for emphasizing autonomy over integration, independence
50
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over interdependence, and exit rights over voice.59 I address the specifics of her challenges later,60
but even she notes that “Even as scholars regularly announce the death of sovereignty, they remain
haunted by its ghost.”61 I would suggest that looking at religions as sovereigns reveals the renewed
salience of the concept. At its base, sovereignty deals with issues of power, loyalty, and legitimate
authority. While it is true that American states in the twenty-first century have less power and
command far less loyalty than they did at the time of the founding, religions continue to exercise
authority and command significant loyalty. For example, even though the percentage of
denominationally-affiliated younger Americans has decreased,62 the loyalty of those remaining has
increased.63 Researchers suggest that the increase of religious options increases the commitment
level of believers.64 Increased religious commitment is also evident in the global South and in
American believers and denominations stemming from it.65 Questions of religion in the public
square and the role of religious organizations continue to fill public debate.66 Paul Horowitz
suggests that we live in an “age of contestability,” where “precisely because religion is of fading
importance to some people, it is of increasing importance to others.”67 Sociologists recognize the
power religion exercises over its adherents and their loyalty to it, which can lead in extreme cases to
religiously-motivated violence.68
Recognizing this power and loyalty, however, begs the second objection--whether seeing
religions as sovereigns vests too much authority in religion. I will address some more detailed
versions of this objection later,69 but as an initial matter, the objection seems based on discomfort
with the authority that religions claim over their believers and concerns that believers, working with
perceived absolute truths, are especially prone to extremism and intolerance.70 Recognizing the
sovereignty of religion as a legal matter could seem to overly privilege religion or legitimize
religious anti-democratic beliefs.71 As I understand these concerns, they seem to stem in part from a
fear that recognizing the sovereignty of religious organizations grants them too much power, a fear,
perhaps, that the state would then be powerless to regulate harmful actions of believers or retain its
base in liberal democratic theory. Recognizing shared sovereignty, however, does not mean
granting religious groups unlimited power. Sovereignty is not unlimited. Even sovereign states are
59
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bound by compacts, agreements, treaties and participation in international organizations. Western
European states, for example, have limited their sovereignty through the formation of the European
Union.72 Citizens of one state who reside in another one fall under the jurisdiction of both on many
issues. Religious organizations as sovereigns are likewise subject to limitations, compromises, and
overlapping jurisdictions. Recognizing the sovereignty of religious organizations does not grant
them carte blanche, but does insist that states treat them with the respect due a legitimate source of
authority. 73
Some may argue that it is inappropriate for a liberal democracy to share power with or
legitimize harmful or anti-democratic religious beliefs by accepting their sovereignty.74 I would
argue that this objection can be addressed by a fuller understanding of sovereignty. Recognition of
sovereignty, both historically and as a matter of politics, does not turn on utilitarian arguments that
countries somehow deserve recognition as a sovereign because of the good that they do or the
normative value of their system of governance. States recognize other sovereign states as sovereign
simply because that is what they are, not because they necessarily want to legitimize their regimes.
Recognizing a formidable rival for what it is generally is a much safer course than ignoring it and
hoping it will go away quietly. Historically, like states, religion has not had only beneficial effects.
Reflecting what has been called the “ambivalence of the sacred,”75 the power that religion wields
has been used for ill as well as for good. Recognizing a sovereign, however, does not require a
moral endorsement of its regime. It is true that some political theorists argue that at an extreme, state
abuse of its sovereignty may justifiably permit complete lack of recognition of sovereignty by other
states. Recognition that this was one of the theories justifying the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,
however, may suggest some of the problems with the theory.76 In a similar way, a state’s refusal to
recognize any sovereignty of a religion because of its perceived harm should also been seen at the
very least as an extreme measure, fraught with unexpected dangers.
Another initial concern that might arise with the idea of the sovereignty of religion is a fear
that the religious sovereign would not, in turn, recognize the sovereignty of the state, either in part
or in whole. This is not an unfounded fear. Religious organizations often do make conscientious
objections to state laws, and, in a few cases, refuse to recognize civil authority entirely.77 It is
important to remember, however, that “[f]or a non-state legal order to recognize the state is not to
accept all its pretensions. It is not to accept state exclusivism and all that it implies. It does require,
72
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however, treating the state as a legitimate source of legal authority.”78 And, it is also worth noting
that “[t]he striking fact . . . is that most non-state legal orders do recognize the state.”79 In those few
cases where religious organizations refuse to recognize civil authority or rulings and engage in
active, hostile resistance, then the case becomes similar to that of neighbor states engaging in
hostilities, with all the unfortunate consequences that can flow from that.80
It should be understood that I use the concept of sovereignty of religions as a metaphor81 or
conceptual framework.82 I am not arguing a return to the status of religious organizations as
significant state sovereigns over physical territory83 as they were before the Peace of Westphalia, but
rather using the legal conception of sovereignty to help understand how religions function as a legal
matter. Legal attributes of sovereignty distinguish religions from philosophical or moral systems or
other associational groups in terms that the law can identify and deal with. While I argue that the
basic elements of religion that indicate sovereignty cut across cultures and religious traditions,84 I
am not claiming that sovereignty is or should be an exclusive definition of what a religion is.85
78
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Sovereignty, however, is key to understanding how religions function as a legal matter, why
religions work differently than other organizations or beliefs in the legal world, and why religious
freedom matters. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious beliefs and organizations differ
from other types of beliefs and organizations because they assert authority over their members, who
accept the legitimacy of the source of the authority.86 Respecting religious freedom can then be
understood as a question of inter-sovereign respect rather than an exceptional deference to a private
entity or believer.
As I argue in Parts III and IV, the United States has extensive experience and theory
concerning inter-sovereign respect, particularly in the case of federalism. Theories and experience
of federalism abound and prove exceedingly apt in describing the significant values religious
freedom protects and identifying concerns about the proper enforcement of religious freedom.
Approaching religious freedom through the lens of federalism also reveals some of the deep and
difficult issues that it presents. Reconciling the claims of multiple sovereigns has never been simple.
I suggest, however, that the struggle to explain and understand these tensions in federalist theories
provides a useful heuristic to understand how similar tensions are resolved in the religious freedom
context. In Part V, I assert that the striking parallels that federalism and religious freedom exhibit
further illuminate the “specialness” of religion and suggest that sovereignty can be understood as the
deep structure of law and religion.

III. Shared Sovereignty and the Federalism Heuristic
Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin posited that sovereignty entailed a single supreme ruler. In
practice, however, sovereignty had already been split in England with parliamentary limits on
absolute rule, as the civil war and Glorious Revolution subsequently made clear. The U.S.
Constitution provided the first modern written constitutional attempt to share sovereignty, both
between branches of government and between states and the federal government. To a
contemporary U.S. audience, the concept of shared sovereignty seems straightforward, but in many
ways it was a radical move at the time of the founding. Just as Justice Scalia rejected the concept in
Smith that religion could be a “law unto itself,”87 sharing sovereignty among political entities
seemed conceptually impossible. If a sovereign is supreme, then how can there be two sovereigns in
a single realm?88 The distinction modern philosophers make is that a sovereign can be supreme
while being non-absolute--absolutism is a question of what questions a sovereign has supreme
control over. EU member states, for example, are non-absolute sovereigns: while they exercise
absolute authority over most issues, they do not have absolute authority over those issues falling
under EU treaties. This question of absolutism arises in the federalism context. Some have
sole definition of religion. Non-state sovereigns need not be religious—these can be seen to include NGOs or the
mafia—and it would not be impossible to imagine a religion that asserted no recognized authority over its adherents.
86
The fact that some individual members of a tradition may feel little loyalty to their organization or beliefs does not
matter. State sovereigns also have members with little loyalty or limited obedience. The point is that the members as a
whole accept the source of legitimacy of the religious authority, just as citizens of a state as a whole accept the source of
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questioned whether federalism is truly a sharing of sovereignty or whether it implies nonsovereignty for states because they are ultimately subordinate to the federal authority.89 While there
is debate about how much sovereignty was originally left to the states and how much they do or
should exercise now, the basic conception of federalism was a shared sovereignty with the ultimate
authority being vested in the U.S. constitution, treaties, and federal laws.90 States are non-absolute
sovereigns that retain supreme authority over some issues.
While the issue of sovereignty has been raised in the religion context,91 the question of
federalism as a model of shared sovereignty with religion has yet to be explored.92 Perry Dane, who
has addressed the issue of religions as sovereigns, passed over federalism as an appropriate
description of the relationship of sovereigns because he felt that it does not fully express the
sovereignty of religious groups.93 I would argue that seeing religion as a non-absolute sovereign
with supreme authority over internal religious affairs still respects the sovereignty and authority of
religions. Shared sovereignty over temporal affairs is simply a fact of life for religions--as a
practical matter religions in the United States have been forced to either submit to the supremacy of
secular state regulation or disband.94 The last significant wholesale resistance to national secular
law by a religion resulted in the sending out of a national army, disenfranchisement of believing
citizens,95 and federal appropriation of most of the religious organization’s property96— not unlike
the results of state resistance to federal authority in the Civil War.
I would argue, however, that accepting the federal (or secular) government as the final
decision-maker in points of conflict does not undermine the sovereignty and authority of states (or
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religions).97 Losing the competence to decide points of conflict may mean losing absolute authority
over the issue of who resolves conflicts, but this does not prevent a religion or state from being a
non-absolute supreme ruler in the rest of its own sphere.98 It is significant in the issue of religions as
sovereigns that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there are areas where it
must defer to religious decisions.99
I suggest that federalism provides a very helpful pattern for understanding the values and
theories of religious freedom. In my discussions of federalism, however, I do not rely on pre-Civil
War federalism or those of any particular political or intellectual tradition. Much of the value of
federalism as a heuristic is precisely the richness and diversity of federalism theories themselves. In
sections IV and V, I address a wide variety of theories of federalism, which each raise differing and
overlapping answers to the question of the values underlying shared sovereignty. I explore how
historical experiences and theories of federalism parallel in striking and instructive ways theories of
religious freedom. The heuristic device of federalism raises a host of interesting parallels and
issues; for purposes of this article, I will focus on what insights federalism brings to the questions of
the value of religious freedom. I argue that seeing religions as sovereigns provides not only an array
of relevant arguments as to the value of religious freedom, but that the fruitfulness of the approach
itself ultimately reinforces my claim that religions indeed function as sovereigns, which is a key
reason why religion is “special.”
Federalism, in all its variety, becomes a comparative foil and heuristic device for
understanding and analyzing religious freedom. Like all comparative endeavors, the comparison
between federalism and religion is not an exact fit, but does reveal interesting and surprising
differences and similarities. In this case, it particularly shows the strength and variety of the
arguments for religious freedom as well as the sources of concerns. I address the various theories of
federalism in turn, and comment on the particular fit of the metaphor with religious freedom in each
case.
Using federalism, especially together with sovereignty, may raise many of the same initial
objections as sovereignty. In the United States context, federalism is freighted with the powerful
and repugnant history of abuse of states’ rights, Jim Crow, and unchecked violations of
constitutional rights. Trying to connect religious freedom and federalism might seem to be doing
religion a disservice. Although some call for the complete abandonment of federalism,100 in general,
even the justices and scholars who exhibit the most concern about violations of individual rights in
the name of federalism still see some values in a federal system and propose some variant thereof.101
I argue that even the arguments of those who propose eliminating sovereignty-based federalism
97
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provide a fertile source for an understanding of the values and concerns that arise in the religious
freedom context. As I examine these, I also suggest that concerns about state oppression that arise
from the history of federalism in the U.S. are less significant in the religious context because of the
low exit costs, multiplicity of choices, and lack of coercive power of religion.102

IV. Values of Federalism and Religious Freedom
One of the most striking aspects of comparing theories of federalism and religious freedom
is how little consensus there is on the values underlying protection of religious freedom, which
stands in stark contrast to how much consensus there is on the values underlying federalism.
Religious freedom scholars disagree on much, but agree that they cannot come to consensus on why
religious freedom is protected. Doug Laycock notes that “[c]ontemporary scholars have puzzled
over why the Constitution would specially protect religious liberty, as distinguished from liberty in
other domains.”103 Bill Marshall similarly notes that there is “little agreement as to what values
underlie the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”104 Mark Tushnet asserts that
“[c]onstitutionalists today are committed to developing a law of religion even though they do not
understand why they have to do so.”105 Paul Horowitz questions whether the debate of theories of
religious freedom in the United States “exhibits the pointless excitability of a dog chasing its own
tail.”106 Justice Scalia describes First Amendment jurisprudence as “a maze.”107 To some extent the
religion field is polarized by those who accept or are at least willing to leave room for religious
valuation as underlying the First Amendment and those seeking to rely on purely secular rationales
for explaining its protections.108 Federalism theorists, on the other hand, are “intimately familiar
with [federalism’s] benefits.”109 “Academic literature richly extols the oft-expressed reasons
underlying the American invention of divided government.”110 The U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized lists of benefits of federalism.111 Perhaps a comparison with federalism can
better bring to light some of religious freedom’s key underlying values.
A. Whose Federalism?
In this section, I examine the proffered benefits of federalism and assess to what extent these
apply in the field of religious freedom. As an initial matter, however, the question should be asked:
“Whose federalism?” Various theories of federalism have been advanced since the founding of the
U.S. and each theory focuses on slightly different aspects of the traditional list of federalism’s
values. The narrative of dual federalism, for example, differs considerably from that of the current
neo-federalists. Is federalism about relative competencies in problem solving, restraining
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government power, or about the recognition of minorities? My point in this article is not to assess
these competing claims or make any normative arguments about the value of federalism, but simply
to draw out the various arguments to see what values federalism can be said to promote. The fact
that there is such a sizeable and thoughtful cluster of varying theories of federalism, each
emphasizing different strengths (or weaknesses) is one reason that it is such a useful heuristic in
examining approaches to religious freedom.
With its sizable list of benefits, federalism points to the richness and usefulness of looking at
multiple benefits and rationales of shared sovereignty. If theorists of the First Amendment have
been stymied by searching for “the reason” for religious liberty112 or an unwillingness to discuss the
possibility of religious truth,113 perhaps one significant value of the heuristic device of federalism in
the religious context is recognizing the possibility of multiple underlying values, tied together by an
overriding secular device that serves as a legal bracketing of religious truth claims. Seeing religion
as a sovereign is itself clearly a secular legal concept, but one that gives space for truth claims while
bracketing them in the secular world. The sovereignty of religion depends upon its authority with its
own believers, which as an internal matter often turns on truth claims, so these elements so core to
the self-understanding of a religion are at play in the process. Nevertheless, recognizing the
sovereignty of religion does not require the secular state to take a position on the validity of internal
truth claims of a religion, just as recognizing sovereignty of a foreign state does not require
recognition of its governing structure as just or democratic. Instead, the state bases its support of
sovereignty, or, I would argue, religious freedom, on the legal functioning of the sovereign. The
extensive values of recognizing and sharing sovereignty, as will be evident in the discussion of
federalism, are largely based on pragmatic and secular ideals.114
In the following sections, I examine these various values identified in theories of federalism,
and provide some thoughts on how these translate or compare to the values underlying religious
freedom. I also include contemporary decentralism theories in this account. While these are not
strictly speaking federalist theories,115 they represent an extreme emphasis of one set of values of
federalism and thus, I argue, correspond well to one group of theories about religious freedom.
B. Dual Federalism and Separate Spheres
1. Dual Federalism and Its Values
Edward S. Corwin, in a notable article in the 1950 Virginia Law Review, lamented the
passing of dual federalism.116 He defined dual federalism as comprising four postulates:
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only;
2. Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few;
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3. Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are ‘sovereign’ and hence
‘equal’;
4. The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than
collaboration.117
In essence, this describes an approach used by the Supreme Court in which it sharply circumcised
and policed the spheres of state and federal responsibility. Although there has been some quibbling
about dates,118 the U.S. Supreme Court has been seen to follow a dual federalism approach as early
as Justice Taney and up through approximately 1937.119 Dual federalism, with its sharply delineated
spheres for states and the federal government,120 often focused on states’ rights and the
constitutional limits of enumerated powers.121 Some have suggested that recent federalism cases
reflect a dual federalism mentality.122
Dual federalism theory particularly emphasizes a few aspects of federalism. First, it focuses
on the distinctive functions of states and the federal government, with particular emphasis (as
compared to other approaches) on the importance of state functions. Federalism’s value, from this
approach, is to have the states and federal government “each working upon the same persons; and
yet working without collision, because their functions are different.”123 Protecting the function of
states was seen as of particular value because they were the country’s strongest republican units at
the time of the founding. Corwin notes that “[f]ederalism’s first achievement was to enable the
American people to secure the benefits of national union without imperiling their republican
institutions.”124 The Federalism, in the dual federalist model, was needed to protect the “vital cells
that [the states] have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse, and action.”125
In connection with its role of protecting reservoirs of “democratic sentiment, impulse, and
action,” federalism was appreciated for its value in building up state initiatives, energiz[ing] state
policies,126 and preventing “concentration of excessive power.”127 These points are picked up later
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by other federalism theories, reappearing as the value of states as laboratories for experimentation
and federalism’s value in checking the absolute power of a national government.
Fundamentally, however, dual federalism turned on the fact that, at least initially, states were
the primary unit of government. Until modern advances in technology, transportation, and
communication, most facets of peoples’ lives in times of peace were governed by the states. This is
described in The Federalist Papers:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce . . . The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of
the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.
The operations of the Federal Government will be most extensive and important in
times of war and danger; those of the State Governments, in times of peace and security.128
Initially at least, states’ rights was not a slogan, but a description of reality. Broader interpretation
of Congressional powers was seen as “permit[ting] invasion of the reserved rights of states and thus
endanger[ing] the existence of the federal system.”129 In post-Civil War, modernized America,
however, dual federalism theories have long “lost all descriptive force.”130
2. Sphere Sovereignty Theories and Their Values
Dual federalism in many ways lines up very neatly in the religious freedom arena with
traditional understandings of sphere sovereignty, developed by German and Dutch Calvinist
philosophers over the last several hundred years. Drawing on the thinking of Calvinist Johannes
Althius (1557-1638), sphere sovereignty has been expressed most articulately in the nineteenth and
twentieth-century writings of Abraham Kuyper131 and Herman Dooyeweerd,132 and discussed in the
U.S. context by Paul Horwitz.133 Sphere sovereignty “sees a profusion of organically developed
institutions and associations, including both church and state, operating within their own authority
structures and barred from intruding into one another's realms. Although this appears to be a theory
of a limited state, it is also a theory of the limits of religious entities.”134 State and church are each
vested with sovereignty over a sphere of life but are restricted to action within their own spheres.
Sphere sovereignty “proclaims church and state to be distinct social structures” which “do not derive
their respective competencies from one another, but are in each instance endowed with an internal
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enclave of domestic powers that emanate from the typical structure of the social entity concerned . .
.”135
At first blush, sphere sovereignty seems to be the obvious fit for a religion-as-sovereign
theory. Sphere sovereignty does emphasize the organically sovereign nature of religion and its
independence from the state. It is important to note, however, that the religion-as-sovereign theory
and federalism heuristic are broader and indeed provide resources for criticisms of sphere
sovereignty. Like dual federalism, sphere sovereignty is an initial, almost reflexive approach once
one takes legal pluralism seriously. If both states and the federal government are sovereign or if
religion and a secular government are sovereign, then they must each have their own realms and
governing structures. But just as dual federalism is not the only approach to federalism, so too
sphere sovereignty is not the only way to approach religious freedom or religion-as-sovereign.
The federalism heuristic further suggests possible problems with sphere sovereignty. Dual
federalism largely faded when faced with the increasingly nationalistic pressures of modern life and
the expanding reality of concurrent jurisdiction136; so too could arguments be made that a division of
spheres in a religious context is overly simplistic and unrealistic in modern life. Religious
involvement in education, social service provision, and employment, all areas typically heavily
regulated by the state, suggest the complexities of mapping sphere sovereignty onto contemporary
life. Recognizing this does not necessarily mean rejection of a religion-as-sovereign approach, but
suggests that sphere sovereignty may be only one of several approaches that recognizes and respect
religions as sovereigns.
Sphere sovereignty, however, like dual federalism, is useful at the very least as part of an
attempt to assess the values underlying religious freedom. Paul Horwitz suggests several values
significant to the sphere sovereignty model, which in many ways echo the values of federalism
highlighted by dual federalists. 137 For example, sphere sovereignty recognizes the reality of legal
pluralism, which ensures that a unitary state is not “enthrone[d] . . . as an absolute good.”138 “In
both its broad outlines and its internal structure and limits,” sphere sovereignty “threads a middle
path that avoids both statism and atomistic individualism.”139 In connection with this, sphere
sovereignty stresses the importance of mediating structures. “It acknowledges that associations
serve as a vital means of community in an egalitarian and commercial democratic republic which
might otherwise render human life intolerably atomistic.”140 As with dual federalism, the argument
that states (or religion) are necessary as a mediating structure to check the power of a centralized
state is also made.
Both dual federalism and sphere sovereignty also recognize that some social ordering
predates our modern states. To successfully form a federal constitution required recognizing the
preexisting competencies and functions of states; sphere sovereignty emphasizes that secular states
must similarly recognize the preexisting claims and functions of religion. Sphere sovereignty “sees
associations as an intrinsic part of the ordering of human existence, and honors these associations as
135
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a central and divinely ordered aspect of human life.”141 These arguments are not as frequent under
other theories, and have become increasingly contested under late 20th and early 21st century theories
that stress individual autonomy and associate mediating structures with hierarchy and oppression.
As I argue later,142 however, these concerns in the federalism arena do not necessarily transfer with
full force to religion: in contrast to states, religion has no police power and has lower exit costs.
The parallel with dual federalism also suggests the further, related line of argument that, like
states at the founding, religions function as a “vital cell” of “democratic sentiment, impulse, and
action.143 In general, aside from the more difficult question of tolerance,144 empirical studies show
that religion has a high correlation with democratic and civic values. For example, religious
Americans are more generous in volunteering145 and giving charitable contributions, both in
religious and in secular causes.146 Studies also show that religious Americans are also up to twice as
active civically as secular Americans.147 After standard statistical controls, studies show that they
are more likely to belong to community organizations, energize community problem solving, take
part in local civic and political life, and press for local social or political reform.148 This is true of
religious Americans across the political spectrum.149 Religiosity has also been associated with high
levels of self-control, a virtue which has been cited as important to promote the physical, emotional,
and financial health of individuals and communities.150 Among a long list of demographic and
ideological characteristics, religion is also the strongest predictor of altruism.151 In many ways, the
argument for religion as a cell of democracy may be stronger than that of states, because unlike
states, which engage in similar democratic processes to a federal government, religion fosters the
exercise of moral and intellectual virtues needed for democratic governance such as “reflective
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judgment, sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the ability to cooperate, and toleration,”152 which
“according to liberalism’s own tenets, fall outside its strict supervision, and that it not only does not
always effectively summon but may even discourage or undermine.”153
My point here is not to develop this or any one particular argument for religious freedom, but
to use the federalism heuristic to assemble a broad array of arguments for (and against) religious
freedom. The narratives of dual federalism and sphere sovereignty highlight values such as a legal
pluralism that avoids statist and atomistic constructions of society, the respect due a social ordering
that pre-dates the state, and the value of religion as a “vital cell” of “democratic sentiment, impulse,
and action.” To some extent these also reappear in other theories of federalism.
C. Process Federalism and Smith: Long Live Political Safeguards
1. Process Federalism and Its Values
Another major theory of federalism has been referred to as “process” federalism or
“federalism as empowerment.”154 This approach, first articulated in Herbert Wechsler’s 1954 article
“The Political Safeguards of Federalism,”155 and refined by Jesse Choper,156 is reflected in U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence from 1937 until the 1990s.157 Process federalism recognizes the value
of federalism, but sees this as largely protected by the U.S. political process, separation of powers,
and individual rights instead of by judicial enforcement of a division of spheres between the states
and federal government. Even though Wechsler saw national action “as exceptional in our polity, an
intrusion to be justified by some necessity,”158 he saw federal intervention against the states as
primarily a matter for congressional determination, not judicial review.159 His argument that “it is
Congress rather than the Court that on the whole is vested with the ultimate authority for managing
our federalism” was based on the impact of the states on the federal government through the
apportionment of senators, state control of districting of representatives and voter qualifications, the
electoral college, and the Framers’ views.160 Other commentators have suggested further
refinements161—Larry Kramer, for example, argues that political parties provide the modern
political safeguards of federalism162 and Bruce LaPierre argues that Congress’s political
accountability provides the needed political safeguards.163 Process federalism reached its zenith in
152
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the 1985 Supreme Court case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,164 in which
the Court overruled a 1976 decision, National League of Cities v. Usery,165 in which it held that the
Tenth Amendment barred federal regulation of the activities of state and local governments.
Process federalists choose to emphasize slightly different values of federalism than those
dual federalists did. Wechsler mentions in passing, for example, the states as “preexisting sources
of authority and organs of administration”—“[t]he fact of the continuous existence of the states,
with general governmental competence unless excluded by the Constitution or a valid Act of
Congress, set the mood of our federalism from the start.”166 He notes, however that “[i]f I have
drawn too much significance from the mere fact of the existence of the states, the error surely will
be rectified by pointing also to their crucial role in the selection and composition of the national
authority.”167 He focuses on states as “the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and
opinion, the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical determinants of national
as well as local politics.”168 Larry Kramer expands on this idea of federalism protecting state
interests through state institutions. From his perspective,
The whole point of federalism (or at least the best reason to care about it) is that, because
preferences for governmental policy are unevenly distributed among the states and regions of
the nation, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking. Federalism is a
way to capture this advantage, by assuring that federal policymakers leave suitable decisions
to be made in the first instance by state politicians in state institutions.169
He rejects mere decentralization—national representatives “will predictably be less responsive than
representatives elected to serve in formally autonomous state or local governments . . .”170
“Federalism must be understood as a means rather than an end: an institutional strategy formulated
to assure a greater degree of decentralization than is ever likely to be seen in a unitary system.”171 A
slightly different description of this goal of responsiveness is offered by Erwin Chemerinsky, who
identifies the values underlying process federalism as “having multiple levels of government and in
multiple actors to deal with social problems.”172 In sum, process federalists primarily see
federalism’s value as delivering better-tailored decision-making, increased responsiveness and an
increased number of actors to resolve problems.
2. Smith and the Values of Religious Freedom
In many ways, the process federalism approach parallels the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise
regime since Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court rejected judicial exemptions for
religious claims.173 Just as it did in Garcia, the Court overturned precedent in Smith to retreat from
a judicial role for protections of state/religious sovereignty. In an infamous passage, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, stated:
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Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill
of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. . . . It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs.174
It is deeply ironic that opponents of process federalism suggest that the horrifying logical extension
of Garcia would be something akin to this reasoning in Smith, or, as Justice Powell’s Garcia dissent
puts it, what “[o]ne can hardly imagine this Court saying,” that is, “that because Congress is
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the bill of Rights are amply protected in
the political process.”175
Although Smith, like process federalism, is usually seen for what it limits—i.e., judicial
enforcement—rather than what it promotes, both do pay some tribute to the values underlying
religious freedom or federalism. Smith reaffirms the value of a core of religious freedom/religionas-sovereign when it rejects a judicial role specifically for issues of religious competence:
Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.” As we reaffirmed only last
Term,”[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretation of those creeds.”
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious
claim.176
The Court’s discussion is abbreviated and does not discuss in any depth why “it is not within the
judicial ken” to interpret the centrality or validity of beliefs, but the fact that the Court used
jurisdictional and sovereign-like terms of reference suggests that the religion-as-sovereign and
federalism heuristic are helpful in understanding a broad swath of approaches to religious freedom,
including one as narrow as Smith. Perhaps Smith, like Wechsler, begins its political protections
approach with an understanding that religions, like states, had preexisting authority. Bill Marshall
defends Smith’s core result through arguing, like process federalists, that exemptions are not needed
or helpful or traditional in protecting religion.177 His view is that religion should be treated as a “a
product of theistic obligation rather than individual freedom”178 and that exemptions “undermine[]
the constitutional values [they] purport[] to protect, [are] inherently arbitrary, force[] courts to
engage in a balancing process that systematically underestimates the state interest, and threaten[]
other constitutional values.”179
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An interesting question is to what extent the other process federalism values of bettertailored decision-making, increased responsiveness and increased actors to resolve problems
translate into the religion sphere. Religion does not primarily or directly deliver democratic goods
in the way states do, but an interesting argument could be made that just as they serve as democratic
“cells” by promoting the non-liberal values underlying a liberal democracy,180 they can be said to
promote better-tailored non-governmental social impacts. Certainly empowering religion and
religious actors increases the number of actors to resolve social problems. Religions are heavily
involved in providing social services such as education, hospitals, and care for the poor, and have
done so far longer than the state.181 The idea of the uneven distribution of policy preferences
resulting in greater satisfaction through decentralized decision-making could apply with equal force
here. Religious beliefs and social-good preferences are, like political beliefs, presumably unevenly
distributed. Decentralizing decision-making on the question of religious beliefs and views of social
goods by permitting and protecting various religious groups to espouse and carry out their own
beliefs and conceptions of the social good should also result in greater overall satisfaction.
Process federalists’ understanding that state interests are protected through state institutions-“the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of political
activity, the separate geographical determinants of national as well as local politics”182—is also
relevant to the world of religious sovereigns. This part of process federalism theory would suggest
the importance of protecting citizens’ religious interests through their religious associations,
underscoring the value of a group rights approach to religious freedom issues.

D. “Federalism as Limits” and Its Values: The Judiciary to the Rescue
1. “Federalism as Limits” and its Values
Another major approach to federalism has been described as “federalism as limits.”183 In
many ways, this is a broad tent that includes a variety of modern theories that defend judicial
involvement in limiting the federal government’s power. Following the federalism cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court from the mid-1990s to the present,184 these generally draw on themes of dual
federalism,185 but recognize that federal and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction over
many issues. Supporters of “federalism as limits” type arguments include Michael McConnell, 186
John Yoo,187 Steven Calabresi,188 David Shapiro,189 and others.190 They rely on originalism191 and
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the various values that federalism is seen to promote.192 Although, again, some of these values have
been cited by earlier approaches, it is instructive to see the different emphasis and articulation of the
values that comes in these versions of federalism. In response to spirited opposition, limits
federalists propose more detailed understandings of the values that federalism promotes.
Core among the values limits federalists cite are federalism’s increased representativeness,
the role of states as “laboratories for experimentation,” the value of competition among jurisdictions,
the normative value of increased political participation, and the liberty protection role federalism
plays. I address each of these in turn. First is the question of increased government responsiveness,
relied upon also by process federalists. This is often lumped together with other economic
arguments for federalism: that it increases encourages experimentation and increases competition
among jurisdictions.193 In support of the argument for responsiveness, contemporary limits
theorists, relying in part on public choice theory, assert that, because preferences are not uniformly
distributed, smaller decision-making units will lead to increased satisfaction overall.194 Limits
federalists recognize that situations involving economies of scale, significant externalities, or
compelling arguments from justice may undermine this calculation.195 Michael McConnell argues
that federalism, however, is important to resolve a different externality problem, that of the tragedy
of the commons.196 He cites Nobel laureate James Buchanan as having mathematically
demonstrated “that centralized decision making about projects of localized impact will result in
excessive spending—excessive meaning more than any of the individual communities involved
would freely choose. Each community would be better off if they could agree in advance (as they
thought they did in the Constitution) to confine federal attention to issues of predominantly
interstate consequence.”197 Limits federalists also argue for the value of innovation and competition
that federalism reflects. States, being more numerous than the federal government, are statistically
more likely to engage in innovation198 and will compete for taxpayers and jobs through a race to the
top.199
Those arguing against limits federalism maintain that federalism is not as responsive for
minorities that are not concentrated; federalism will not be as representative of the needs and
interests of groups of lower social prestige and economic power spread as minorities among many
states.200 Critics also argue that the economic values of responsiveness, experimentation, and
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competition could be equally achieved through a non-federalist decentralized government.201 In
response, limits federalists assert that there is still a “prima facie economic case for constitutionally
mandated decentralization”202 and that federalism is particularly significant because it entrenches
decentralization203 and because the value of political participation is normative as well as
instrumental.204 This argument draws on “the model of participatory government, which goes as far
back as Aristotle, [that] views political activity not as instrumental towards achieving a
proportionate share in the distribution of available resources, to be used in a variety of private
pursuits, but rather as a good in itself, something essentially implicated in the very concept of
human freedom,” a good that is shaped in community with others and infuses the lives of its
members with a “sense of purpose.”205 To the extent that political involvement in a community is
seen as a normative good, this can best be achieved at the state level, where popular referenda and
direct citizen participation are more common features.206 From this perspective, one of the
important values of federalism is “preserving alternative modes of decisions making.”207 This
perspective reflects a more communitarian approach, one that is inspired by “an ideal of a tightly
knit community of persons who share each other’s values and concerns and for whom politics does
not resolve to a periodical exercise of voting rights but rather stands for the most general expression
of their common aspirations.”208
Finally is the conception, also seen earlier in nascent form, that federalism is an important
bulwark against tyranny.209 Contemporary thinkers break this down into several aspects –
federalism’s protection against tyranny by the majority, tyranny by a minority faction, tyranny by a
self-interested central government, and federalism’s help in fostering voluntary compliance with law
and public-spiritedness. Federalism protects against tyranny of the majority by diffusing significant
powers among the states, limiting the power of a possibly tyrannical centralized government.210
Further, individuals can leave states more easily than they can a nation, calculating that oppression
by states, as problematic as that is, is less harmful than oppression by a centralized government.211
Limits federalism also raises the old argument that a large number of people removed from direct
participation in politics are more susceptible to political demagoguery and mass manipulation212 and
the newer argument that the issues in cases most worthy of federalist limits are those, such as Lopez,
that involve federalizing of crimes and increases in federal power over issues of civil liberty.213
Limits federalists also raise the issue of oppression by the few, relying on political choice theory that
suggests that even originally weak organizations have a tendency to grow and ossify into a small
number of powerful interests.214 These interests capture power and use governmental power to
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reinforce their own cohesion or prevent competing groups from effectively organizing.215 The
“existence and vitality of local governments may provide an important counterbalance to the
constellation of forces at the national level.”216
Finally, limits federalists rely heavily on the idea that federalism prevents oppression by a
self-interested, powerful central government.217 This draws on public choice theory that suggests
that federal legislators will expand federal jurisdiction to be able to regulate more issues and attract
broader political support.218 In addition, limits theorists suggests that the risk of authoritarianism at
the federal level is more dangerous than that at the state level, because a centralized government
would be more capable of maintaining a severe and durable oppression.219 States’ power and
authority, although themselves potentially dangerous to individual rights, are necessary to break a
centralized government’s monopoly on coercive power and create a powerful bastion against the
possibility of oppression. Rapaczynski suggests that this argument is supported by the German
Weimar experience where federal imposition of martial law by the rightist central government on
Prussia, the largest German state led within a few months to Goering’s use of Prussian forces to
intimidate Nazi political opponents, permitting the rise of Hitler.220
Limits theorists recognize the challenges to the freedom arguments posed by U.S. history
and the struggle for civil rights in the South.221 The states’ rights arguments of dual federalism were
used to justify and protect state oppression and denial of civil rights to its citizens of color. Those
opposed to limits federalism argue that “history has demonstrated that the smaller the population
and geographic area, the greater the likelihood of dominance by a single political party or machine
with a single set of mores,” with subsequent pressures toward conformity and narrower tolerance for
individual liberties.222 Others note the problem of high exit costs and the limited practical mobility
of an underclass as limiting the effectiveness of liberty through movement among states.
McConnell’s response to these arguments is to suggest that while Madison was likely correct in
arguing for protection of individual rights through a centralized government (although he does
suggest modern public choice theory emphasizing the power of a small, cohesive faction cuts
against Madison), the argument proves at most the importance of dual protections of rights through
both states and a central government.223 He recognizes that some issues are so fundamental to basic
justice that they are removed from both state and federal majoritarian control.224 Federalism,
however, remains an important tactical consideration for those seeking greater protections when a
national consensus has not emerged. McConnell illustrates this with the value of initial abolitionist
state-by-state decisions;225 many contemporary advocates would see the same liberty value in statelevel recognitions of same-sex-marriage rights.
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Limits theorists also argue that federalism promotes liberty through fostering voluntary
compliance with law and public-spiritedness.226 By relying on smaller units of government close to
the people, individuals have increased confidence in their rulers and willingness to voluntarily
comply with law.227 This tracks public choice theory that suggests that cooperation sufficient to
overcome the prisoner’s dilemma or free-rider problems is more likely in a smaller community with
greater cohesiveness and increased likelihood of monitoring and stigmatizing anti-social behavior.228
In a related vein, limits federalists argue that smaller dimensions promote public spiritedness, which
encourages citizens to promote the common good over their own interests.229 This public
spiritedness arises both from active engagement in policy formation, which increases individual
buy-in to policies and laws, and to the feelings of benevolence or willingness to sacrifice for others,
which increase as groups become smaller and closer to the individual and her family.230
2. Sherbert/Yoder and the Values of “Religious Freedom as Limits”
“Federalism as limits” arguments parallel most closely decisions and theorists supporting the
exemption regime before Smith, usually known as the Sherbert/Yoder compelling state interest test.
Under this approach, religious freedom is judicially protected through religious exemptions from
neutral, general laws unless the state has a narrowly tailored compelling interest.231 Although this
doctrine as a constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause was struck down by Smith, it
remains prevailing law in most jurisdictions, either through federal legislation valid as against the
federal government232 or state constitutional law or legislation.233
These approaches, however, could draw additional strength (and draw some additional
criticism) from parallels with “federalism as limits.” For example, arguments on representativeness
raise (as mentioned in section IV.C.2) interesting possibilities for arguments of the value of religion
in providing increased community responsiveness. Religious organizations, with their considerable
reflection of social and value ordering, can make society more responsive to individuals’ social and
value preferences. Religions run the gamut from highly collective to highly individual, deeply
involved in individuals’ daily lives or having limited impact on daily living, supporting
countercultural or mainstream values (whatever one chooses to identify as countercultural or
mainstream). The variety of religions provides for a community that can be much more responsive
to individual needs than could a centralized secular government, and increases overall societal
satisfaction. Protecting religious freedom could then be seen as a communitarian value, one that
enhances the possibilities of strong and viable community-building structures.234 This argument,
however, is, like federalism, subject to counter-arguments of negative externalities or compelling
arguments of justice. For example, accommodation of employee work schedules around Sabbath
observance may turn on the extent of harm of the externality to co-workers of having to work
additional weekend days. Theories of protection of religious freedom could also be subject to the
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arguments against federalism that both are not sufficiently representative for non-concentrated
minority groups. Sexual minorities, for example, at least in religious groups that do not accept
LGBT relationships, could argue that their religious groups are not sufficiently representative of
their beliefs.
In a similar way, parallels with federalism could increase the emphasis on the value of
religious experimentation and competition. Indeed, religious freedom’s argument is even stronger.
The number and size of states are essentially fixed, but religious groups regularly grow, fade,
blossom, and divide. Religions have low exit costs and generally low startup costs. Protecting
religious freedom facilitates the multiplicity of beliefs and the opportunity for new and potentially
valuable religious developments. The argument for decentralization as a proxy for
representativeness, experimentation, and competition is simply untenable in the religious field.
Religious sovereigns govern in ways so different from a secular state that it is impossible to imagine
that having religions as extensions of the secular state could produce the creative foment that is
perpetually found in the religious world.235
Parallels between limits federalism and religious freedom have been more fully developed,
however, along the lines of the arguments that federalism promotes non-instrumental values and the
social good of political involvement in a community. Religious liberty theorists have examined a
broad range of potential non-instrumental values that religious freedom protects: the normative
value of religion,236 the normative value of First-Amendment institutions,237 the possibility that there
could be correct religious beliefs,238 the value of alternative nomos,239 and the value of religious
liberty as liberty.240 Communitarians recognize the more closely parallel argument that religion is
valuable to help establish social ties.241 If a value of federalism is seen as “preserving alternative
modes of decision-making,”242 this argument surely applies with even greater force in the argument
for religious freedom, given the variety and distinctiveness of religious modes of decision-making.
Religious freedom arguments can also be made that parallel federalism’s bulwark-againsttyranny arguments. Religion has traditionally had a prophetic role, one that has been critical of
dominant power structures and sees its role as speaking truth to power.243 While history is replete
with religions that have been co-opted by authoritarian regimes or oppressive policies, there are also
many examples of religions serving as loci of opposition, such as the Polish Catholic Church under
Communist rule, or the religious actors and groups who were at the forefront of the abolitionist
movement. Protecting the sphere of action of religious groups supports their authority, which can be
used in ways that challenge state policies, such as promoting racial integration of schools,244
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opposing abortion and the death penalty, or celebrating same-sex marriages.245 Religions’ prophetic
and authoritative voice (at least among their members), similarly positions them to challenge and
help counterbalance capture of national politics by minority interest groups. Just as in the federalism
context, however, the challenge has been increasingly raised in the religious context that religions,
like states, are themselves restrictive of liberty.246 Unlike states, however, religions lack police
power and have comparatively low exit costs, suggesting that liberty-limiting concerns may not be
as significant in the religion sphere as they are in the federalism context. Further, just as federalism
may be tactically helpful in areas where a national consensus on rights has not been achieved, so too
religious freedom has been used to claim rights protections not yet covered by federal law.247
The argument can also be made that religious freedom, like federalism, can help prevent
oppression by a self-interested powerful government. Just as granting power to states breaks the
central government’s monopoly on coercive power and places them in a position to effectively resist
federal oppression, religious freedom breaks a secular state’s monopolistic claims to truth and
authority. Protecting the authority and soft power of religion ensures that there are rivals to the selfaggrandizement and mission creep of a secular state. Civil society theorists have extensively
discussed the importance of religion and other elements of civil society in this regard.248
Finally, religion has strong parallels with federalism’s value of fostering voluntary
compliance with law and public-spiritedness. Religion has historically been important to
establishing the rule of law249 and current thinking on the rule of law argues that to be effective, rule
of law requires a correspondence between the law and social norms.250 Law imposed in
contravention of the social norms of a majority will see a decline in voluntary compliance and “if
the gap between law and lived values is too large, the rule of law itself will not take hold.”251
Religions have served an important role in helping establish and promote social norms and provide
community buy-in through reflecting the authority of traditional religious-legal institutions.252 Many
successful democracies, such as Israel and India still “deviate from modern liberal legal practice by
accommodating traditional religiously based rules, precisely in order to get buy-in from the
communities involved.”253 Religion not only promotes voluntary compliance with law, but, as
empirical studies suggest,254 has a high correlation with other aspects of democracy and civic
values.255 For example, religious Americans of all political persuasions are up to twice as civically
engaged as secular Americans.256 Peter Berkowitz further argues that liberal democracies depend on
245
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the development of non-liberal moral and intellectual virtues such as “reflective judgment,
sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the ability to cooperate, and toleration.”257 Current research
and thinking seems to suggest that religion has an even stronger argument than federalism for its
ability to fostering voluntary compliance with law and public-spiritedness.
E. Modernists and Post-Modernists
1. Madisonians, Decentralizers, and Neo-Federalists: Federalism’s Values (or Lack
Thereof)
Some contemporary thinkers about federalism advocate significantly different proposals for
dealing with the issues federalism raises. I address three major groupings of these proposals:
advocates of neo-Madisonian “cooperative federalism,” who examine the complex modern
interrelations between states and the federal government; decentralizers such as Edward Rubin and
Malcolm Feely, who advocate replacing federalism with decentralization; and neo-Federalists such
as Akhil Reed Amar and Heather Gerken, who advocate for federalism, but reject the underlying
conception of state sovereignty. In many ways, these thinkers are all grappling with what role is
appropriate for federalism in contemporary America, given the rise of the welfare state and the
destructive legacy of states rights’ theories on civil rights.
Neo-Madisonian cooperative federalists rely heavily on the work of Morton Grodzins, who
identified the complexities of separating federal and state interests and actors in the modern
regulatory state, 258 and argued that the primacy of the federal government in a cooperative structure
reflects what Madison perceived federalism to be.259 Morton Grodzins is most noted for his
insights on the complex intermingling of federal and state power and the image he invokes of a
marble cake.260 He asserts:
The greatest complications arise when attempting to determine the locus of decision-making
power. For example, it cannot be assumed that members of the national legislature or of the
national executive speak only in the ‘nation’s view’ while state and local offices represent
only parochial non-national views. . . . An analogous problem is the way in which special
interest groups – date growers or electric train manufacturers, for example – will identify
themselves as representing the local or state interest when the burden of their position is one
of avoiding national regulation. . . . Even when states and localities are speaking for
themselves, it is often not easy to determine whether their views are distinct from the
national view. This problem is exacerbated by the universal tendency of all Americans to
legitimate their actions in terms of the national interest.261
Cooperative federalists see the complexity as “creatively blending” the powers of federal and state
governments, “using the federal fisc to harness state and local capacities to national objectives while
allowing for a measure of decentralized flexibility in implementation.”262 These theories draw on
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Madison’s efforts to strengthen federal control over the states, such as his proposed federal power to
negate state laws.263 Centralized governments are also better-placed in this view to remedy
discrimination and injustice against minorities.264 Critics of unlimited cooperative federalism argue
that such strong centralized power exercised in “cooperative” methods such as conditional grants
can also be profoundly destructive of state and local autonomy in restricting state options,
conscripting state actors in the service of federal politics, and constraining the fiscal direction of
states, thus impairing federalism’s values of accountability and representativeness.265
Some take the modern concerns with federalism to their logical extreme and advocate
eliminating federalism in favor of decentralization.266 These approaches argue that the most
significant values associated with federalism are just those of decentralization, and that the
remaining normative arguments for federalism are insufficient.267 A decentralized system where
“decisions are made by subsidiary units and the central authority defers to those decisions” is
contrasted with a federal system, where “subordinate units possess prescribed areas of jurisdiction
that cannot be invaded by the central authority, and leaders of the subordinate units draw their power
from sources independent of that central authority.”268 In contrast to decentralization, which is seen
as an instrumental, managerial strategy, federalism is a recognition of rights, which, although they
can be justified by instrumental arguments, reflect a collective willingness of society to subordinate
its purposes to those of the rights holders.269
Decentralizers argue that federalism arguments for representativeness, competition,
increased choice, and experimentation are really just decentralization arguments.270 Federalism’s
arguments for the diffusion of government power and protection of communitarian values, however,
are seen as unique to federalism. Rubin and Feeley argue that “[w]hile there is an undeniable
validity to [the diffusion of power] argument for federalism, it can readily be overstated,271 citing
the fact that the only power diffusion at issue in federalism cases is administrative power. Rubin
and Feely’s see federalism’s value in its argument for community, which in turn gives meaning and
definition to peoples’ lives, and facilitates decision-making within a group’s own context and
system of relationships and meaning.272 Rubin and Feely particularly address the concepts of
affective communities, where individuals in the group feel a personal or emotional connection to
one another, and political communities (also called “dialogic” or “rational” communities) where
members of the group engage in a collective decision-making process regarding major questions of
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self-governance.273 They argue that federalism does not protect or foster affective communities
because they involve smaller groups with stronger emotional attachments than states.274 Federalism
in the United States, they argue, likewise does not foster political communities because states are
artificial administrative units and “the uniqueness has long since given way to the national
culture.”275 Decentralizers reject notions of state sovereignty as this “presents too much danger to
outsiders and its own members”276; the self-assertion involved in sovereignty is instead properly
“associated in our liberal culture with an autonomous individual.”277 Some theorists of
decentralization also draw on postmodern subjectivity and work on localism, asserting that the
centered subject and collective identities are fluid and suggesting alternate views of de-centered
legal subjects that would include cities.278
There are a variety of neo-Federalist theorists—two of the most prominent are Akhil Reed
Amar and Heather Gerken.280 Like decentralizers, both reject notions of sovereignty, but both
argue that federalism can still be meaningfully retained. Heather Gerken argues, drawing on
localism, that federalism should be “minority rule without sovereignty” and can be seen in all levels
of institutions down to the level of juries, zoning commissions, local school boards, etc.281 She
argues for the need to orient “federalism-all-the-way-down,” as she defines it, as promoting “voice,
not exit, integration, not autonomy, and interdependence, not independence.”282 Federalism-all-theway down reflects a distinct view of power, the “power of the servant,” which turns on
interdependence and integration, akin to a checks and balances model with integrated multiple
decision-makers.283 By orienting federalism around institutions that lack sovereignty, she argues, a
nationalist account of federalism can be created that “converts federalism’s signature vices into
plausible virtues”—the national majority can still reverse minority oppression if it is willing to
expend the political capital and, through local institutions, minorities and outsiders can be brought
into the political body and exercise power in ways that feed back into national debates.284
279

Akhil Reed Amar argues that federalism without state sovereignty is not only possible, but
more reflective of the conceptions of the Founders.285 He suggests that sovereignty was understood
to be located in the people, rather than the states, tracing this back to the English Glorious revolution
of 1688, where legitimacy was seen as flowing up from the people instead of down from God.286
Amar argues that the U.S. constitution vested sovereignty in the people of the United States as a
whole, not merely as states or people of various states.287 He rejects the conception of state
sovereign immunity for ultra vires acts, seeing the Eleventh Amendment as merely a refusal to
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extend independent federal jurisdiction over suits against states by noncitizens of that state.288
Federalism is seen as a “two-edged sword for constitutional justice” where each constitutionally
limited government can police the constitutional limits on the other’s powers and remedy the other’s
constitutional violations.289
2. Madisonians, Anti-Religious Freedomists, and Neo-Religious Freedomists?
The modern and post-modernist takes on federalism lead to interesting and varied
comparisons to religious freedom. Echoes of neo-Madisonians can be heard in theorists who focus
on the complex interrelations of religion and the state. Derek Davis, for example, has described the
U.S. system as being one with “separation of church and state, integration of religion and politics,
and accommodation of civil religion.”290 Others have noted that “the state and religious
organizations continue to expand the areas in which they have contact. Thus while officially
separated, religious organizations and representatives of government have a level of interaction that
is arguably higher than ever.”291 Tension also arises with “Christianity as the culturally dominant
religion in America and a constitutional order that treats all religions alike.”292 Drawing on neoMadisonian approaches and theories of civil society, some argue for the value of cooperation
between religion and the state. Carl Esbeck describes this as a “priestly” model of a church’s role,
in contrast to a prophetic role that challenges the state.293 The “priestly” model sees the democratic
state as an agent for good, which builds on and encourages voluntary impulses. “Avoiding a
monolithic, state-monopolized structure to the delivery of service is desirable,” he argues, and
religious organizations, through voluntary agencies, can perform this role without excessive
regulation or autonomy problems.294 Given the realities of a modern welfare state, religious
organizations must look to the government to adequately fund social welfare and education.295 This
approach, however, has been criticized by those arguing that seeking state funds distorts religious
priorities, that religious activity cannot be easily segregated into temporal and sectarian, that
government regulation proves too intrusive, that religions cannot challenge the status quo if they are
co-opted with state funds, that religions should not use resources to do what can be done by the
state, that state funding draws social services away from religious control, that religion cannot
contribute meaningfully without remaining apart from the state, and that the church must be free to
focus on its primary mission.296 These parallel some of the concerns about cooperative federalism
restricting state options and skewing the federalist values of accountability and representativeness.
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Akin to decentralizers’ push to eliminate federalism, reductionists argue that religious
freedom itself should not be privileged over other forms of speech or expression.297 The only values
these theorists see in the First Amendment are “the secular, relativist political values of the
Enlightenment which are incompatible with the fundamental nature of religious faith.”298 Just as
decentralizers try to strip the values of decentralization from federalism, so too do reductionists see
their role as winnowing out values relating to religious freedom that are still acceptable in modern
life. Like decentralizers, those opposing distinctive protections of religious freedom are concerned
about the power inherent in seeing sovereignty in religious organizations and its potential for
abuse.299 The parallel with decentralizers suggests that perhaps statist assumptions that religions are
mere creations of the state which lack normative value as alternative communities and loci of power
may be also at play. Decentralizers criticize federalism’s assumption for the need of normative
disagreement among subordinate units so that different units can subscribe to different value
systems, asserting that disagreements are instrumental and that “the criteria for judgment are shared
by or imposed on those within the system.”300 Unlike states and federal governments, however,
religions and a secular government do subscribe to different value systems. It would seem difficult
to suggest that their disagreements are merely instrumental and that they exhibit shared criteria for
judgment. It could easily be argued that clash of value systems between the state and religion
reveals the inadequacy of a managerial strategy for instrumental disagreements or the conception
that fundamental disagreements between the state and religion can be commonly resolved by a
centralized decision-maker’s fiat.301 Reductionist approaches, however, in suggesting that religions
are the creations of the state or the sum of religious expression and religious speech, seem to suggest
that this could be the case.
What is particularly interesting here are the arguments that decentralizers see as unique to
federalism—diffusion of power (discussed above in section IV.D.2) and formation of community.
Rubin and Feeley’s argument reject communitarian arguments for federalism because of the
arbitrary and large nature of states. These arguments seem to cut against the arguments of those
opposed to the privileging of religion. Religions, in contrast to states, are affective communities,302
which provide a deep source of identity. Post-modern arguments about the impossibility of a
centered self and the fluid nature of group definition are not necessarily problematic in the religious
context. In contrast to fixed ideas of a centered-self state, religions, according to some accounts at
least,303 have always defined themselves in fluid and anti-essential terms. Religious engagement
with text and with the divine or transcendent, has always involved interpretation and narrative. Post297

See Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITTT. L.REV. 75 (1990); Frederick Gedicks, “An Unfirm Foundation: The
Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions” 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 555 (1998), 574 (“There no longer
exists a plausible explanation of why religious believers—and only believers—are constitutionally entitled to be excused
from complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral belief”); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Nondiscrimination Law 75 FORD.
L.REV. 1965 (2007).
298
Gey, Why is Religion Special, supra note __ at 79.
299
See Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Ironies of Hosanna-Tabor: Three Speculations (unpublished paper)
300
Rubin and Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra note __ at 912.
301
See Rubin and Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra note __ at 912 (“It is possible, and
indeed quite common, to resolve such normative disagreements [in federalism] by a centralized decision-maker’s fiat.”).
302
Rubin and Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, supra note __ at 945 (“To be sure, there are
affective communities to be found in various parts of the United States: religious groups, Native American tribes, even
towns with relatively homogenous populations.”).
303
See, e.g., RADICAL ORTHODOXY (John Milbank, et al., eds. 1999) (offering mainstream Christian post-modern
accounts of Christianity).

35

modern critiques of sovereignty, such as Frug’s and Foucault’s, suggesting that “no one could trust
such an entity to exercise unsupervised power” and that fear of sovereign power “is so common that
it is routinely converted into a subjected sovereignty, a sovereignty limited by some other
sovereignty,”304 certainly also has its parallels among opponents of broad conceptions of religious
liberty.305 From the perspective of religious believers, the sovereignty that limits the sovereignty of
religions is often seen as divine or transcendent sovereignty. Some religious thinkers have also
emphasized that the sovereignty of religion is one not of this world, “truth, not of empire but of
grace and redemption.”306 While these approaches and forms of protection may be not be credible to
the non-religious, the continued loyalty and willingness of many religious believers to be subject to
religious authority suggests that fears of sovereignty may not be universal.
Neo-Federalists’ challenges to state sovereignty also provide interesting possibilities for
cross-over into the religious freedom arena. Both Gerken’s “federalism-all-the-way down” and
Amar’s sovereignty in the people reflect some current criticisms of religious freedom—that
religions may not always address the concerns of individuals within religions. Gerken’s approach
would perhaps suggest that one should look at individuals as having sovereignty and study how their
interactions with religion and with the state provide them voice, interdependence, and integration.
The distinctive normative natures of religion and the state as opposed to states and a central
government create some problems for cross-over here: individual involvement and voice in religion
does not necessarily work upward in as direct a chain from religion to the state as it could from
states to a central government. Voice, however, is highly relevant in a religious context. As Paul
Horwitz notes, recognizing concerns about how churches use their authority can “lead us to think
more clearly about the role of internal and external monitoring by church authorities, the laity, and
citizens at large in encouraging churches to wield their power prayerfully, compassionately, and
responsibly.”307 Gerken’s approach also suggests the possibility of interesting work looking into the
way that religious individuals interact with religion and the state—questions of dissenters, formation
of orthodoxy, and creation of social norms, law and community. From the view of the “power of the
servant” she suggests, religious individuals also become part of religion’s involvement in the
decision- and norm-making societal chain. Individual involvement in religions and sub-religious
organizations may form a significant way for minorities to become civically engaged, which would
correlate with some of the empirical studies mentioned earlier about the increased civic engagement
of religious Americans.308
Gerken’s sense of the value of federalism being primarily minority rule has particular
salience for religion, as unlike states, religions are discrete and at times insular minorities.309 While
she would also probably look at groups below the level of a religion as a whole (perhaps religious
orders, volunteer groups, congregations, campus crusades, etc.), it is significant that religious
freedom gives religious individuals, religious groups, and religions as a whole voice and
involvement in society. Unlike federalism, religious freedom in the U.S. has been understood both
at a collective and an individual level and has been instrumental in giving voice and involvement to
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racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.310 It would be interesting to look at the role religious
freedom has played in giving otherwise unheard voices to religious minorities such as of Jews,
Sikhs, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or others and integrating them into the American political and social
world.311
Amar’s ideas about sovereignty vesting in the people could also have multiple interesting
crossovers. To some extent, this parallels the arguments made that religious organizations should
not be exempt from discrimination laws, seeing the sovereign power instead in the individual
citizens.312 Amar, however, does not argue that federalism should be not protected, merely that
states should not be immune from ultra vires acts, raising the interesting parallel of whether
religious freedom could be protected so long as religions are not acting unconstitutionally. His
arguments as a whole, however, may not directly apply, since he relies heavily on the history of the
passage of the Constitution to suggest that the Founders understood sovereignty as being vested in
the people. Unlike states, however, the question of sovereignty of religion was not raised explicitly.
To the extent this question is addressed in the First Amendment, it can be argued that the explicit
ban on Congressional jurisdiction left religious sovereignty either with religions or in the states, but
an argument like Amar’s on federalism in the religion field would be much more tenuous. To make
a textual argument asserting complete jurisdiction by American citizens over religion, he would
have to depend on the First Amendment (implicitly) granting sovereignty over religions to states,
which was then taken up by “we, the people” through the Fourteenth Amendment. It is possible that
Amar’s ideas of resting sovereign power in the citizens may also suggest conceptions of group
religious rights as being collective expressions of the individual rights of citizens rather than group
rights per se. Amar also focuses on the importance of states as legal protectors of rights vis-à-vis
the federal government. While, as discussed above, religions provide important checks on
government and protections of individual liberties, religions lack the coercive power of states in a
federal system and cannot directly protect constitutional rights against federal violations.

V. Taking Sovereignty Seriously: Sovereignty and “Specialness”
A. The Value and Values of the Federalism Heuristic
Section IV discussed theories of federalism, their parallels in religious freedom theory, and
the values in which both are grounded. This use of federalism as a heuristic device illuminates
many of the values underlying religious freedom, as well as the values that might cause some to
question or limit it. Some of the possible arguments and values favoring a broad understanding of
religious freedom include: the recognition of preexisting ordering systems; the value of legal
pluralism; the value of mediating institutions that avoid statist or atomistic constructions of society,
religion as a cell of democratic sentiment, impulse, and action; better-tailored non-governmental
problem-solving; the development of non-liberal values needed in a liberal democracy; increasing
the number of actors to resolve social problems; increasing social satisfaction by decentralizing
310
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decision-making on religious beliefs, social ordering, and other social goods; the value of promoting
religious experimentation and competition; protecting non-instrumental values such as
communitarianism, the normative value of religion or First Amendment institutions, the possibility
of religious truth, and the value of alternative nomos and increased liberty; strengthening institutions
that can criticize and provide checks on government oppression; preventing authoritarianism by
breaking a state’s monopolistic claims on truth and authority; helping establish voluntary
compliance with law and public-spiritedness; the value of religions in delivering social services; and
increasing the civic engagement, voice, and role of minority individuals and groups. The federalism
heuristic also brings to light several arguments that could be made against religious freedom: that
religions are insufficiently representative of their members; that privileging religions will limit
rights of individuals; post-modern critiques of sovereignty and power structures; and assumptions
that power must reside in the nation or in the people instead of intermediate groups.
The federalism heuristic raises many other interesting issues which are beyond the scope of
this paper, such as what insights theories and experiences of federalism and religious freedom share
on the question of the proper enforcement mechanisms. The striking parallels between Garcia and
Smith and judicial enforcement and the religious exemption regime suggest that this would also be a
fruitful topic. It would also be interesting to look more closely at the implications that the religious
freedom parallel has for federalism, including how federalism was and can continue to be (perhaps
outside the U.S.) a system to work out tensions between conflicted loyalties, whether a direct right
of action for federalism violations (or federalism violations in a particularly significant area) would
be possible or sensible along the model of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, whether
federalism rights should be lodged in smaller units than states, and whether state citizenship could
be formulated in a more fluid manner, perhaps with dual citizenship, in a way that would decrease
exit costs and increase competition and experimentation. Understanding religion as a sovereign can
serve to increase the comparative resources available not only to religion scholars, but also to
federalism ones.
Another interesting aspect of religious freedom that the federalism heuristic illuminates is
the question of whether religious freedom can be divided into categories of structural protections
and individual rights,313 or whether there is an underlying unity of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. This issue arises in the federalism context, where it has been argued that the
Framers did not see the distinction between structural protections (such as enumerated powers) and
rights (such as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments), and thus outlines of rights should be understood
primarily as jurisdictional limits on the federal government.314 The religion-as-sovereign approach
reinforces claims of an “underlying unity” between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, i.e., that, like federalism, these can be seen as complimentary structural solutions to
protecting religious sovereignty and freedom.315

B. So Is Religion “Special”?: Sovereignty and Deep Structure
The usefulness of the federalism heuristic in the religious freedom context is manifold.
Specifically, for purposes of this article, the heuristic not only identifies numerous overlapping
313

See Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Ironies of Hosanna-Tabor: Three Speculations (unpublished paper).
See Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, supra note __ at 1392-3; Akhil Reed Amar, Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
315
See text accompanying note __.

314

38

values at the core of religious freedom, but itself serves to further illustrate how religion is different
from other claims of conscience or philosophy or other associational structures. In contrast to
claims of philosophical belief, associational structures, or conscience,316 concepts of sovereignty and
methods of sharing sovereignty lie at the heart of religious freedom. Sovereignty is simply
inapposite in describing other associational structures and philosophical or moral claims. Whether
or not one accepts the continued viability of sovereignty as a concept, it is the elephant in the
federalism room and, I would argue, in the religious freedom one. Heather Gurken’s comment in
the federalism context rings true in the religious one as well: “Even as scholars have rejected a
sovereignty account, they remain haunted by its ghost. They continue to deploy narratives about
power, jurisdiction, and identity that mirror those of sovereignty’s champions.”317
For example, Steven Gey, who first explicitly posed the question of whether religion is
“special,” argued for a strict separationist approach and opposed religious accommodations, arguing
that religion is an inappropriate basis for political and constitutional “favoritism.”318 His arguments,
however, are laden with arguments about sovereignty, control and jurisdiction. For example, he
summarizes his account of religious accommodations thus: “The essence of the accommodation
principle requires that democratic control over certain aspects of public policy be subordinated to a
higher force that is beyond human control.”319 Bill Marshall spends his force opposing “religion as
identity,” which focuses on the role of religious communities.320 He sees the Establishment Clause,
for example, as “guarding against the state’s being captured as a vehicle to promote religious
identity,”321 implicitly accepting religion as a rival power structure. Arguments over religious
exceptionalism and religious liberty turn on sovereignty because the deep structure of religion and
law involves sharing of sovereignty. Understanding religion as a sovereign has been a key part of
the structure of Western political and religious history,322 and continues to inform our approaches to
expand or restrict religious liberty. Religious freedom itself in the West was formed through similar
successful and less successful attempts to disentangle and juggle the competing demands of church
and state sovereigns.323
On their face, Sager and Eisgruber, Gedicks, and others who raise equality and individual
autonomy concerns seem to avoid questions of authority or jurisdiction. Their appeals to liberal
democratic values such as autonomy, equality, however, can easily be understood in a sovereignty
context—in essence, they are trying to solve the problem of competing sovereigns by eliminating
the power of the religious one. By leveling the charge against religion that it is illiberal and
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undemocratic, they accept the terms of the secular sovereign to define religious sovereigns out of
any meaningful authority. This is rather like charging that states are undemocratic because they do
not impose uniform law throughout a nation.324 If they did impose uniform national law, however,
they would cease to be states, just as religious communities would lose their character as affective
communities if they became liberal democratic political communities.325
This charge does, however, indirectly raise the interesting question of whether the religionas-sovereign model reflects an ontological category of religion or merely describes our
particularized historical situation. To the extent that religion-as-sovereign reflects part of the
ontological nature of religion, attempts to completely eradicate its authority in favor of a secular
sovereign are eventually doomed to failure. If this is the case, then religion is an essential element
of humanity. On this view, religion and religious communities reflect a deep human need, one that
liberal democracies cannot satisfy and should not try to eliminate.
To the extent that religion-as-sovereign does not reflect ontological religious claims and is
merely a description of current realities and a particularized historical experience, the proposal of
eliminating protections for religion still raises significant issues. Even if religion is seen as merely a
power play by reactionary feudal forces that undermine the essence of the liberal democratic project,
the descriptive power of the religion-as-sovereign approach suggests that at the very least religious
sovereignty is a current description of reality. The problem for those seeking to eliminate or
drastically reduce its authority becomes one of transition. While one may reconceptualize an ideal
society from a tabula rosa, eliminating the protections of sovereignty from religions still requires
eliminating the sovereignty of an existing, freely chosen group of private individuals. In many
ways, this is an extreme version of the militant democracy problem: can a democracy act in illiberal
ways in order to protect its existence? While we might be sympathetic with the democratic
elimination of an armed and threatening militia group that proclaimed its sovereignty and declared
war on the democracy in question, what of the democratic elimination of the sovereignty of a
peaceful, nonthreatening religious group simply because it disagreed with the group’s values? I am
not sure that this would meet the standards of tolerance and autonomy that a liberal democratic
system would seek to impose on religion. To draw on the federalism heuristic, the anti-liberal antidemocratic argument against religious exceptionalism parallels active enforcement of an equivalent
of the Republican Guarantee Clause326 against religions. States, however, entered the constitutional
union with republican governments—the Guarantee Clause was merely designed to maintain
existing sovereign relationships. Rejecting religious exceptionalism and eliminating protections for
religious freedom is the equivalent of forcing states to change their forms of governance hundreds of
years after ratification of the constitution. Further, as argued previously,327 ceasing to respect the
jurisdiction of a sovereign based on the sovereign’s threats to democracy or violations of human
rights is not unknown, but comes with significant risks and costs.
Of course, one need not accept that even illiberal and undemocratic religions are
fundamentally incompatible with a secular democratic state. If anything, the federalism heuristic
highlights that multiple sovereigns need not have identical goals, be based on similar values, or use
the same kinds of governance structures. States, for example, may govern by popular referenda,
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elected judges, or other features that would not be permitted in the federal governing structure.
Moreover, many of the values identified by federalism depend on differences between federal and
state governance—increased social satisfaction through decentralization, responsiveness and
representation, states as checks on federal power or factions, the value of experimentation,
promoting communitarianism, etc. I would similarly argue that religion’s value and contributions
also depend on its differences from a secular state. Permitting the terms of a secular liberal
democratic state to significantly define or limit religious authority destroys much of the
contributions that religion can provide society.
The deep structure of religion-as-sovereign in religious liberty can not only be seen in
arguments that oppose religious exceptionalism, but also ones that support it.328 Scholars
advocating the uniqueness of religion focus on the distinction of realms between private religion and
a public state,329 the comparative unimportance of religion to unbelievers,330 government
incompetence to judge religious truth,331 the precedence of religious claims to believers,332 the
protection of religious minorities,333 and the power of personal commitments and associational
bonds334 all of which reflect an implicit understanding of dual sovereigns with distinct jurisdictions
and the authority that adherents recognize in religion. Other more instrumental arguments, such as
the role of religion in civil society and encouraging civic virtue,335 as well as religious or
communitarian non-instrumental arguments,336 parallel arguments identified through the federalism
heuristic that flow from religion-as-sovereign and shared sovereignty.
Particular note should be made of the argument that religious exceptionalism serves to
prevent religious strife.337 Current empirical research on religious freedom suggests that protections
for religious freedom are an immensely practical solution (if one with still unresolved boundary
lines) for settling peaceably the contesting loyalties of shared sovereigns. Brian Grim and Roger
Finke, for example, have demonstrated empirically how reduced government restrictions on religion
are causative of reductions in social conflict and religious violence.338 They, along with other
researchers, have also shown how increased religious freedom is correlated with high levels of other
freedoms, multiple measures of well-being, prolonged democracy, and better educational
opportunities for women.339 I would argue that perhaps these correlations exist because intersovereign strife is wasteful of resources and a stimulus to extra-sovereign social conflict. Perhaps
religious freedom produces its own “peace dividend,” seen in the positive values that the federalism
heuristic identifies. In any case, religious freedom can be clearly understood not just as a normative
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solution–preferable if one values religion per se--but as an immensely practical way to address the
shared and sometimes conflicting loyalties of overlapping sovereignty.
The fact that conflict arises not only between states that mutually recognize each other’s
sovereignty, but also between a state and a region with disputed claims for independence (one only
needs to think of Kosovo, Chechnya, or East Timor), further suggests that claims of religious
freedom are not dependent on a secular state’s recognition of religious sovereigns as sovereigns.
Similarly, the refusal to recognize the sovereignty of a state, as some theories suggest modern states
should do in the face of extreme violations of human rights or threats to others,340 brings its own sets
of conflicts (such as Iraq or Afghanistan). Refusing to recognize a sovereign or would-be
independent state or religious sovereign is not sufficient to eliminate claims of loyalty and authority,
either in the diplomatic or religious spheres. While these approaches may be necessary at the
margins or in extreme cases both diplomatic and religious, understanding the deep structure of
religious freedom suggests that these approaches bring their own costs.
Understanding the deep structure of religion as religion-as-sovereign explains the core fact
that even arguments against religious freedom can be easily understood and analogized as the
working out of inter-sovereign conflicts. Sovereignty is so core to our understanding of religion that
we seem to be inevitably tied to discussions of authority, loyalty, and jurisdiction in discussions of
religious freedom. But recognizing the fact that religious freedom debaters all draw on implicit
notions of sovereignty, even those criticizing religion, is itself to recognize that religion is indeed
“special” and different from associational structures, philosophical or conscientious beliefs.
In summary, the religion-as-sovereign approach makes a unique set of claims for religious
exceptionalism and provides a strong framework for assessing and conceptualizing these claims.
Together with the federalism heuristic, it provides significant illumination of the values underlying
protections of religious freedom, as well as identifying areas of potential concern. Religion-as-asovereign provides a valuable account for the arguments for and against religious exceptionalism.
Whether or not one argues for a robust protection of religion, religion-as-a-sovereign suggests that
we are still at some level drawing on deep structure of shared sovereignty in the religious liberty
debate, even if only to criticize it or attempt to deconstruct it. This suggests that the question of
whether religion is “special” is ultimately the wrong question. As a sovereign, it is indeed special.
Philosophical, moral, and associational claims do not measure up. Recognizing religion as
“special,” however, does not eliminate all discussion on the value or values of religious freedom—
sovereignty may set up the framework for a relationship between religion and law and identify
salient values, but does not decide all the difficult boundary issues. Arguments have and will
continue to rage about the relative merits of religion and whether and how religious freedom should
be protected, but these are not at their heart questions of whether religion is “special”; by drawing
on deep structural understanding of religion as a sovereign, as they do, they implicitly recognize that
it is.
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